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The Need for a Strong and Stable 
Federal Public Health Agency 
Independent from Politicians
Jacqueline Salwa, Harvard University; Christopher Robertson, JD, PhD, Boston University
SUMMARY. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the precariousness of federal public health institutions in 
the United States, and how disastrously things can go when those institutions are undermined by political 
forces. Such institutions can be disbanded, underfunded, populated with incompetent political hacks, 
manipulated, or sidelined. As a field, public health in particular needs some political space, given that it 
requires deep scientific expertise and needs to communicate to the public clearly, reliably, and with authority 
to engender trust. Key public health agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
in particular, should be buttressed against future political encroachment, using legal mechanisms from 
administrative law, which are tried and true in other domains of governance. Models include the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) (created in 1933), the Federal Reserve System (1913), the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) (1914), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) (1935). Key features of these 
agencies include having multi-member boards of qualified experts to lead them, enjoying independence from 
the president (not able to be fired without cause), and having statutory budgetary authority by not requiring 
congressional appropriation or allowing executive reallocation. We discuss the ways in which independence 
can increase deference accorded by the courts, as well as the risk that it may reduce political accountability.
Introduction
We have three overarching concerns with the institutionalization 
of public health leadership and policy in the United States. The 
first is whether federal institutions are competent to make sound 
decisions and implement them reliably, with appropriate deference 
from the White House, Congress, and the judiciary. Second, is 
whether the American people trust those institutions that they rely 
on for key guidance in regulating their own behavior. Third, is for 
the optimal vertical distribution of authority between the states 
and federal government (Wiley, 2020).
The Need for Stable Competence
In 2018, President Trump disbanded a national pandemic response 
team that had been created after the 2014 Ebola epidemic. As 
a result, no senior leader in the U.S. government was focused 
on global health preparedness. The Trump administration and 
the preceding Obama administration also failed to replenish the 
national stockpile of personal protective equipment (PPE), such 
that even a year after the pandemic began, shortages remained. 
The lack of systematic public health surveillance has caused 
academic and media organizations to try to cobble together their 
own databases from local sources. These failures suggest a lack of 
stable and competent administration, in part due to short-sighted 
political interference.
The Need for Public Trust
The politicization of the pandemic has also undermined the 
American public’s trust in its own institutions, which is reflected 
in the lack of consensus about simple health precautions, such 
as mask wearing, and about whether the new vaccines are safe 
and effective. An independent federal public health agency would 
help communicate information to the public about the vaccines 
and other countermeasures and thereby help regain the trust of 
the public. One cannot blame the public for being confused and 
doubtful. They saw the Trump administration’s surgeon general 
reverse his guidance as to masks, and saw the FDA first issuing and 
then reversing its emergency authorization for President Trump’s 
pet drug (hydroxychloroquine), recognizing the lack of efficacy 
and cardiac safety concerns. Likewise, Americans saw the FDA 
commissioner publicly apologize after inflating the benefits of 
blood plasma in a White House press conference on the eve of the 
Republican National Convention.  
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In a remarkable inversion of foxes and henhouses, in September 
2020 the leaders of nine pharmaceutical companies found it 
necessary to make a public pledge to “stand with science” (Thomas, 
2020). In December 2020, President Trump threatened to fire the 
politically-appointed FDA Commissioner just as the agency was 
in final steps of issuing an Emergency Use Authorization for a 
COVID-19 vaccine, leaving some to wonder whether the agency’s 
decision would be driven by science. That same month, the 
editor-in-chief of the CDC’s weekly Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report revealed that political appointees were interfering with the 
publication, and had instructed her to delete emails proving as 
much (Weiland et al., 2020).
In contrast, one consistent and trusted voice in all this chaos was 
Dr. Anthony Fauci. Even when temporarily sidelined by the Trump 
administration, as a career civil servant in the National Institutes of 
Health, Dr. Fauci was somewhat protected from being unilaterally 
fired by the president. That protection gave him the latitude to 
speak the truth and communicate the best available science, and it 
gave the public reason to trust him.
Of course, political manipulation of public health institutions was 
not invented just for the COVID-19 pandemic; it is rather endemic to 
the field (Bennett & DiLorenzo, 2000). In 2007, a bipartisan group 
of former surgeons general testified before Congress that, “the 
nation’s doctor has been marginalized and relegated to a position 
with no independent budget and with supervisors who are political 
appointees with partisan agendas” (Rovner, 2007). In 2017, officials 
from the Department of Health and Human Services instructed 
the staff of the CDC to not use seven words in its upcoming budget 
appropriation request: diversity, transgender, vulnerable, fetus, 
entitlement, evidence-based, and science-based (Gostin, 2018). 
Some have even argued that because public health is inherently 
political, such politicization is not a reason for concern (Goldberg, 
2012). We believe that this concern is best addressed through 
careful institutional design, with a balance of political interests and 
scientific expertise, as we outline below.
The Need for a Federal Power
Our primary focus is to protect public health agencies from 
horizontal threats from politicized federal actors in the White 
House, Congress, or the courts. However, this is also an opportunity 
to redistribute authority vertically, as between the federal and state 
governments.  
As Lindsay Wiley argued in Volume I of the Policy Playbook, 
“federal-state conflicts have stymied efforts to ramp up and 
coordinate” the COVID-19 response (Wiley, 2020). Last year, for 
example, President Trump blamed states for the failure to reach 
his stated goal of distributing 20 million vaccines by the end of 
2020, notwithstanding the federal government’s planning for such 
a need (Armstrong et al., 2020). Although state governments may 
be more politically accountable than federal actors, and have more 
granular local information and relationships, they lack the scale, 
infrastructure, expertise, power to compel production, and power 
to issue money and spend deficits, which are essential during a 
time of pandemic. 
Traditionally, public health has been conceived as primarily a 
state responsibility that states fulfill by exercising their plenary 
police powers. However, Congress has already recognized that 
the profound effects on interstate commerce created by a public 
health emergency may require the exercise of broad federal powers 
as well. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 264 provides that the surgeon 
general and secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services are “authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in 
his judgment are necessary to prevent the spread of communicable 
diseases … from one State or possession into any other State or 
possession.” So the potential role of the federal government in a 
public health crisis is broad, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
concern in 2012 in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius to “read carefully” the Commerce Clause and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause “to avoid creating a general federal authority akin 
to the [states’] police power.” 
We believe that Congress and President Biden should create an 
independent public health agency that will insulate experts from 
partisan games and the whims of self-serving individuals. The 
agency should, moreover, engender public trust and consolidate 
sufficient federal power and information in order to create 
guidance and manage public health crises.  
The scope of this independent public health agency (or agencies) 
is subject to debate.  One could imagine a complete overhaul 
of the FDA, the CDC, and a range of other agencies that impact 
public health, not just in the times of pandemic but more generally 
(Weinstein et al., 2021). A more modest reform would focus on 
ensuring that the public and policymakers have curated, reliable 
public health information and formal guidance, free of political bias 
(Salwa & Robertson, 2021). The key role would be one of synthesis, 
whether compiling local public health surveillance data or 
synthesizing scientific research about the efficacy of therapeutics, 
beyond the FDA’s binary decision about whether to license the 
product.  
Models for the Independent Agencies
Regardless of the specific scope and mission of the independent 
public health agency, there are important precedents and models. 
The United States has dozens of independent agencies, from the 
Postal Regulatory Commission to the National Labor Relations 
Board — but virtually nothing for public health. Table 9.1 shows the 
design features of eight key independent agencies, out of about 100 
in the federal system.  
The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) presents one model for 
public health governance. The motivating problem of politicization 
is analogous: Congress recognized that if presidents could pump 
money into the U.S. economy whenever an election was coming, 
the economy could overheat and crash. To prevent such boom 
and bust cycles, Congress created the Fed, whose governors 
serve for 14-year terms. Bringing economic expertise, they can 
focus on market fundamentals, rather than the changing winds 
of politics. Not unlike his fierce attacks on other institutions, 
President Trump also pressured the Fed to boost the economy, 
but it largely withstood the pressure, due to its institutional 
features. Nonetheless, partisan political influences have crept 
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To protect net neutrality and broadband privacy; 
regulates communications by radio, television, wire, 
satellite, and cable. 
• 5 commissioners  
• 5 year terms  
•  only 3 can be members of the same political party 




Provides deposit insurance to depositors in U.S. 
commercial and savings banks. In 2010, a new division, 
the Office of Complex Financial Institutions, was 
created to focus on assessment of risk in the largest, 
systemically important financial institutions.
• 5 commissioners  
• 6 year terms  
•  only 3 can be members of the same political party 





Sets interest rates, and regulates banks. Also 
authorizes broad-based programs and financial 
assistance to individual institutions to stabilize 
financial markets. 
• 7 members 
• 14 year terms 




Investigates fraud, identity theft, false advertising, 
and anticompetitive business practices. In 2013 it set 
standards for environmental marketing.  It has also 
been active in the review of hospital mergers, with 
some notable successes in blocking or unwinding 
consolidations.
• 5 commissioners 
• 7 year terms 
•  only 3 can be members of the same political party 




Enforces labor law in relation to collective bargaining 
and unfair labor practices. It supervises elections 
for union representation and can investigate and 
remedy unfair labor practices. Unfair labor practices 
may involve union-related situations or instances of 
protected concerted activity.
• 5 board members 




Enforces federal securities laws, as well as proposes 
securities rules, and regulates the securities industry.
• 5 commissioners 
• appointed by POTUS 
• advice and consent of the Senate 
• 5 year terms 
•  only 3 can be members of the same political party 





Enforces federal election law and campaign finance 
laws. Due to lack of a quorum the commission has not 
functioned since July 2020. 
• 8 commissioners 
• 6 appointed by POTUS 
• advice and consent of the Senate 
•  2 more commissioners: the Secretary of the Senate 
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives or their 
designees 
• 6 year terms 
• only 3 can be members of the same political party 
•  the 6 members POTUS chooses must be chosen because 




Regulates primarily freight rail and other modes of 
surface transportation. 
• 5 full time members 
• advice and consent of the Senate 
• POTUS appointed 
• 2 term limits 
• 5 year term 
•  At least 3 members of the Board shall be individuals with 
professional standing and demonstrated knowledge  
•  2 members shall be individuals with professional or 
business experience  
• 2 term limit
Table 9.1. Examples of Independent Federal Agencies. This table is adapted and expanded from Salwa and Robertson (2021).
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into the process of appointing new governors and public trust in 
the institution has dropped to worrisome levels, illustrating how 
any institutional design will remain contingent on the decisions of 
actors within and outside the institution (Quintyn, 2009).
Design Features
There are several key aspects of independent agency design. 
These include protections for executives, the composition of 
the executives, budgetary authority, and deference from other 
government actors.
Executive Protection
To avoid undue political influence, agency leaders cannot be 
simply fired and replaced at will, as President Trump repeatedly 
threatened to do. Yet, there are constitutional limits to how 
Congress can create such protection. In 1935 in Humphrey’s 
Executor, the Supreme Court distinguished quasi-judicial and 
quasi-legislative bodies, either of which could be given strong 
protections against political interference from the executive 
branch, from quasi-executive bodies, which cannot be completely 
insulated from politics. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has not 
found issue with the statutorily mandated removal criterion of 
“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” to give 
protection beyond the normal “at will” standard for firing a political 
appointee.  
Multiple Confirmed Commissioners  
In its 1976 decision of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court found 
that because the Federal Elections Commission performs 
executive functions, its members must be nominated and 
confirmed by the Senate, as per the procedures in Article II of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court now requires that if an agency 
is to be independent, it must be led by a commission of multiple 
experts. In its 2020 decision of Selia Law v. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Supreme Court held that having a 
single independent director was unconstitutional. Table 9.1 shows 
that agencies are often governed by five or more commissioners, 
and that the executive board is subject to the Senate’s advice and 
consent.
Expertise
The governing statute can specify that officers are to be appointed 
based on their experience, as was the case in Humphrey's Executor. 
This standard has so far struck a decent balance, without 
unconstitutionally restricting the president’s executive power. 
Accordingly, the law should require that the commissioners have 
relevant expertise, including advanced degrees in the relevant 
disciplines.  
Partisanship  
Expert leadership is not enough. Trust in experts has itself 
become a subject of partisan dispute, reflecting both a general 
populist cynicism about know-it-all elites and motivated reasoning 
about whether any particular expert opinion aligns with political 
preferences (a phenomenon known as “solution aversion”) 
(Campbell & Kay, 2014). There is some value in having the members 
reflect the democratic will of the people and both political parties, 
so we propose that the independent agency’s board be balanced 
and staggered so that at least one seat opens within each four-year 
presidential term of office. Such a political balance would facilitate 
both sides working to design solutions that may align with diverse 
ideologies, thereby increasing confidence in and compliance with 
those policies.
Budget  
Another key feature of agency independence is financial. If 
either Congress or the White House can threaten to, or actually, 
eviscerate an agency budget, the agency may succumb to political 
pressures. An independent public health agency might be created 
with dedicated tax revenues related to public health, including 
new taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, legalized marijuana, or low-value 
health care.  Marijuana may present the greatest opportunity, 
as it presently not taxed by the federal government. Federal 
legalization could dramatically drive down prices, which would 
create a substantial opportunity to raise tax revenues, which could 
then be put into a public health trust fund (Gravelle & Lowry, 2014). 
Analogously, the FDA already receives some of its money from fees.
Judicial Deference
Beyond independence from the political branches, an effective 
public health agency also needs to receive deference from the 
courts. Yet, during the pandemic, courts struck down several public 
health measures. 
Public health issues often intersect with key cultural and political 
identities. In November 2020, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn 
v. Cuomo, the court struck down a state order that limited capacity 
in churches to 25 people, but made no limits on capacity for even 
certain non-essential businesses (2020). Rather than deferring to 
an expert agency’s sound discretion, the Supreme Court perceived 
that state governors (i.e., partisan politicians) had made invidious 
distinctions along religious lines. A standing federal expert agency 
may be better able to earn judicial respect as it navigates around 
privacy and liberty interests.  
Even where fundamental rights are not at stake, for an expert 
federal public health agency to have its decisions upheld, the 
questions will be (1) whether Congress acted under an enumerated 
power, (2) whether the delegation to the agency was legitimate 
and well-circumscribed, (3) whether the agency’s action is within 
the scope of that delegation, and (4) finally, whether the agency 
exercised appropriate procedures (including allowing time for 
public comment) in making its decision. With regard to the second 
point in particular, Congress may not delegate its core lawmaking 
discretion to an independent agency. Thus, it should pass a 
statute that gives firm direction to an agency, clearly stating but 
circumscribing its authority. If the governing statute does not 
provide an intelligible principle, it will violate the non-delegation 
doctrine and be struck down, as was discussed by the Supreme 
Court in 2001 in Whitman v. American Trucking. The controversial 
language in that case pertained to the Environmental Protection 
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Agency’s (EPA) power under the Clean Air Act to set “ambient air 
quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the 
judgment of the Administrator, based on [the] criteria [documents 
of Section 108] and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are 
requisite to protect the public health” (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401). In the end, 
the Supreme Court rejected the claim that these words were an 
unconstitutional delegation of power.
However, even if the statute is broad (as many organic agency 
statutes are), the Supreme Court often interprets them narrowly 
to avoid non-delegation problems: For example, in Industrial Union 
Department v. American Petroleum Institute (2019), the statute 
required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
to create standards that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate 
to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment 
... to the extent feasible” (29 U.S.C. § 668). OSHA interpreted the 
statute in order to avoid harming American industry. The Supreme 
Court found issue with the overly broad language of the statute 
but found an intelligible principle that limited OSHA’s power of 
interpretation. These cases were about executive agencies, and 
the conservative court may be more wary of building a bigger and 
less checked government by creating more independent agencies.
Non-delegation is a brewing issue. Wariness over non-delegation 
was expressed by Justices Alito and Gorsuch in 2019 in Gundy 
v. United States, which held that delegations are permissible 
if Congress gives implicit guidelines that agencies can use to 
set bounds of authority. The statutory language that the court 
interpreted in Gundy was that of the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act: “the Attorney General shall have the authority to 
specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter 
to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter 
or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe 
rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other 
categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with 
subsection (b)" (18 U.S.C. § 2250). Justice Kagan found that because 
the attorney general was complying with the apparent purpose of 
the statute when he applied the requirements to all sex offenders 
he did not violate the statute and that because the statute had a 
clear apparent purpose that he must comply with the statute was 
not overly broad. 
Conclusion
When Congress considers how to buttress key public health 
functions of the federal government, it is not working from a 
blank slate. Several federal public health agencies already exist. 
For example, the CDC provides health information related to 
disease. The problem is that Americans do not often follow the 
technical work of agencies, instead they turn to public figures like 
Dr. Anthony Fauci, whose role as a leading scientist made him a 
trusted source, and helped turn the spotlight on him. Ensuring 
that those figures may not be fired at-will should give the agencies 
freedom to put out information that may be seen as controversial 
but is backed up by science. 
At a minimum, one could imagine a limited independent agency 
in charge of some of CDC’s current functions, curating health 
statistics and making health recommendations, both to the public 
as to appropriate behaviors and to policymakers as to a united, 
and federal, plan of action. As part of the Affordable Care Act, 
Congress created the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB) 
to recommend cuts to Medicare, which would go into place unless 
Congress overruled them by a majority vote. Although IPAB’s 
authority was repealed in 2018, it does suggest a model – both of 
potential policymaking and political peril.   
We have focused on the CDC as the best candidate for 
independence, but arguments could be, and have been, made 
for giving the FDA independence as well. In 2019, seven former 
commissioners called for the FDA to be converted into an 
independent agency (Califf et al., 2020). These calls are compelling, 
but the FDA already has robust processes of advisory boards 
and public oversight, as well as some budgetary independence 
from Congress, given its reliance on user fees, paid by industry. 
Moreover, recent years have shown industry actually acting to 
buttress the agency against political interference to maintain 
public confidence (though one must continue to worry about 
industry interference). Ultimately, perhaps some political 
accountability is appropriate for the FDA. Choices between faster 
and shorter drug approvals are matters of normative tradeoffs as 
much as they are technical decisions.
The CDC and FDA have been very salient during the coronavirus 
pandemic. But a different public health crisis, perhaps more like 
the industrial accident at Bhopal, India, would highlight the need 
to strengthen and protect the independence of other independent 
agencies, such as OSHA and the EPA. Frankly, lessons about the 
social determinants of health, suggest that just about everything 
is public health. Thus an ultimate “public health agency” could 
encompass many of the federal government functions.  
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Recommendations for Action
• Congress should create an independent federal expert agency 
whose function, at the very least, is informational and advisory, 
for the public and policymakers to rely upon.
• The leadership of this agency should be subject to presidential 
nomination with Senate advice and consent.
• Congress should explicitly state expertise as a necessary 
qualification for the agency’s leadership.
• Congress should ensure that commissioners can be fired only 
for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”
• Congress should include in the statute staggered terms for 
the agency’s leadership so that each president will typically 
nominate at least one commissioner.
• The independent agency’s leadership should be made up of 
five to seven commissioners.
• The independent agency’s leadership should be formally 
bipartisan.
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